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Many states have or are considering implementing school finance reforms aimed at
lessening inequality in the provision of public education across communities. These reforms will
tend to have complicated aggregate effects on income distribution, intergenerational income
mobility, and welfare. In order to analyze the potential effects of such reforms, this paper
constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of public education provision, calibrates it using
US data, and examines the quantitative effects of a major school finance reform. The policy
reform examined is a change from a system of pure local finance to one in which all funding is
done at the federal level and expenditures per student are equal across communities. We find
that this policy increases average income and total spending on education as a fraction of income.
Moreover, there are large welfare gains associated with this policy; steady-state welfare increases
by 3.2% of steady-state income.
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andNBER and NBER1. Introduction
A distinguishing feature of public education in the US is the
significant role played by local property taxes and the resulting large
disparity in expenditures per student observed across school districts. A
series of State Supreme Court rulings and public concern over public education
have led many states to consider and/or to enact reforms with the aim of
reducing inequality of access to quality public education.
The effects of various reforms to the system of financing public
education are difficult to predict, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Total resources devoted to education, property values, residence patterns and
aggregate welfare may all be affected. Moreover, given educations critical
role in determining individual income, reforms which alter total spending on
education and/or its pattern across communities should have aggregate effects
on income distribution, growth and intergenerational income mobility. This
paper takes a first step assessing the potential effects of education finance
reform. We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of public education
provision in a multi—community setting, calibrate it using US data, and use
the calibrated model to evaluate the quantitative effects of a majorreform.1
We extend to a dynamic setting the model of Fernandez and Rogerson
(1992). This is a multi—community model in the tradition of those pioneered
by Westhoff (1977) and Epple. Romer and Filimon (1984, 1988). Although our
model is highly stylized, it incorporates four features which are central to
notable early attempt to analyze the quantitative effects of some
education reforms is Inman (1978). He estimates a lulti—community model using
data from the New York metropolitan area and examines the welfare effects of
several reforms. One difference between his work and ours is that we model
the income distribution dynamics resulting from changes in the quality of
education received by children. A second difference is that whereas his model
contains more features than does ours, our analysis is explicitly general
equilibrium.—2—
an analysis of public education finance in the US. First, there is
substantial heterogeneity of income across households. Second, individuals
are mobile across communities. Third, public education is provided at the
community level and fourth, funding for public education is largely determined
at the local level.
The population structure is that of a two—period—lived overlapping
generations model in which there is a large number of households every period,
each consisting of one old and one young member. Households choose in which
community to reside. Each community has a local housing market and determines
a tax rate on local housing expenditures by majority vote. The proceeds are
used to provide public education for its residents. An old individual's
income is determined by the quality of education received when young and an
idiosyncratic shock.
The equilibrium inter—community population distribution and the tax rates
that result in a given period determine the quality of education obtained by
each child which, in conjunction with the realization of idiosyncratic income
shocks, then determines the equilibrium income distribution over households
for the following period. This process repeats itself. The equilibrium for
this model has the property that in each period individuals stratify
themselves into communities by income. higher income communities have higher
per student expenditures on education and higher gross—of—tax housing prices.
As a result, children born into higher incoiie households have higher expected
incomes than do children born into lower income households.
te calibrate the model described above to US data. The calibration uses
information on the (cross—sectional) elasticity of educational expenditures—3—
per student with respect to community mean income, the elasticity of
(subsequent) earnings with respect to quality of education when young, price
elasticities of housing demand and supply, mean and median income, and
expenditure shares for housing and education.
In the model described above, public education is entirely funded at the
local level. The major policy reform we analyze is one in which local
financing of education is replaced with national (or state) financing and the
revenue is distributed equally per student across communities. Several states
have taken significant steps towards this kind of system.2
Our analysis highlights the tradeoffs that exist between a local and a
national finance system. The former permits individuals, Liven their income,
greater scope for sorting themselves into communities that more closely offer
their preferred bundles than does a national system which imposes uniform
spending. The latter system, on the other hand, by reducing heterogeneity in
education expenditures, can modify the income distribution in such away to
attain higher average income. While the net welfare effect of the above
tradeoff cx ante is not signable in our framework, our calibration yields the
following results: relative to the case of pure local financing, we find that
a policy of national financing leads to higher average income in the steady
state, higher average spending on education, and higher welfare. The
magnitude of the welfare improvement measured in terms of steady—state income
state public education finance systems vary widely in the extent to
which state aid provisions attempt to lessen the inequality in spending across
districts with some state systems lying close to the extremes of either local
or national financing. Thus, a comparison of these two extreme possiblities
is a natural starting point in an attempt to gauge the potential significance
of education finance reforms that aim to lessen inequalities in local
spending.-4-
is 3.2%, which is a large gain relative to that found for many policies. The
welfare implications of the transition path are also examined. We find that
for annual discount rates smaller than 8.2%, a social planner would choose to
implement the policy change.
Our work is related to two literatures. The first is a theoretical
literature that addresses various aspects of the interaction between
education, income distribution and political economy. Recent contributions to
this literature include papers by Fernandez and Rogerson (1991), Gloam and
Raiikumar (1992), oldrin (1992), Saint—Paul and Verdier (1994), and Perotti
(1993). These papers all consider education as being provided centrally.
Papers which model the local provision of education include Durlauf (1992),
Benabou (1992), Cooper (1992), Fernandez and Rogerson (1993) and Epple and
Romano (1993). A distinguishing feature of our current paper is its emphasis
on quantitative analysis.
The second related literature is a large empirical literature on the
determinants and consequences of expenditures on public education. One aim of
this literature is to examine the pattern of expenditures across communities
in relation to the cross—community variation of variables. Inman (1979) and
Bergstrom et al. (1982) survey this literature and Rothstein (1992) is a
recent contribution. There is also a literature on the relation between
spending on education and outcomes which is too extensive to survey here.
Coleman (1966) is an early contribution, Hanushek (1986) surveys the
literature, and Card and Krueger (1992) provide new evidence on the issue.
The outline of the paper follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark
model. Section 3 discusses the calibration of this model. Section 4 reports—5—
the results of the calibration and of the policy reform carried out in the
calibrated model. Section 5 performs a sensitivity analysis and Section 6
concludes.
2.The Model
The economy is populated by a sequence of two—period—lived overlapping
generations. A continuum of agents with total mass equal to one is born in
every time period. Each individual belongs to a household consisting of one
old person (the parent) and one young person (the child). All decisions are
made by old individuals, each of whom has identical preferences given by:
u(c,h) + Ew(y). (1)
where c is consumption of a private good, h is consumption of housing
services, E is an expectations operator, and is next period's income of the
household's young individual. The function u is assumed to be strictly
concave, increasing in each argument, twice continuously differentiable and
defines preferences over c and h that are homothetic.3 The function w is
increasing and concave.
Individual income is assumed to take one of I valuas: Yi' y2, ..y1,with
.y1. An individual's income when old is determined by q—the quality
of education obtained when young—and an idiosyncratic shock.4 The
3Homothetic preferences are assumed since they simplify computation; they
are in no way essential.
4Thus, we abstract away from any possible peer effects (i.e. the
possibility that who you go to school with matters) and parental
characteristics other than income. Quantitative evidence on peer effects is
mixed. de Bartolome (1990) summarizes empirical findings and provides a
theoretical analysis of peer effects in a multi—community model as does
Benabou (1994). The importance of parental characteristics is the subject of
much controversy (see Card and Krueger (1992)).—6—
prcability that an individual has income Yjwhenold given an education of




Preferences can then be defined over c,h and q:
u(c,h) +v(q). (3)
We ssuznethat v isincreasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable.
Old individuals must choose a community in which to reside. There are
two communities. Each community j is characterized by a proportional tax
onnousing expenditures, a quality of education qj and a net—of—tax housing
pri'e Pj Each community has its ownhousingmarket, with supply of housing
in given byHj(pj).
Note that this function is allowed to differ across
communities, reflecting differences in land endowments and other factors. We
assume that is increasing, continuous, and equal to zero when Pj is zero.
The gross—of—tax housing price in Cj is given by j_(l+tj)pj. We assume that
housing services are rented and, so as not to introduce further complications,
the owners of the housing services are assumed to live outside the two
communitiesand simply consume their rental income. Proceeds from the tax are
used exclusively to finance local public education. We assume that the
quality of public education is equal to per pupil spending on education. All
residents of a given community receive the same quality of education;
education cannot be privately supplemented.5
5See Epple and Rocnano (1993) for a model that incorporates a private
education option.—7—
We now describe the decisions and outcomes that correspond to each time
period. In each period the interaction among individuals and communities can
be described as a stage game of the following form.In the first stage, all
(old) individuals simultaneously choose a community (C1, 1—1.2) in which to
reside. Thereafter, these individuals are assumed Co be unable to move.6 In
the second stage, communities choose tax rates through a process of majority
vote, after which individuals make their housing and consumption choices and
young individuals receive education in the community in which their parent has
chosen to reside. At the end of the period, uncertainty about next period's
income is resolved (note that this occurs before the residence decision of the
following period) .Thentime rolls forward and the two—stage game is repeated
with the previous period's young individuals becoming this period's old
individuals. We analyze the subgame—perfect equilibria of such a game.
Note that from an individual's perspective, a community Is completely
characterized by the pair (r,q). Thus, an individual with income y has an
indirect utility function V(w,q;y) defined by:
V(w,q;y) —Maxu(c,h) +v(q) (4)
c,h
s.t. h+cy, cO, h￿O,
wherec has been chosen as nuxneraire.7 Since each individual can solve the
two—stage period game by backward induction, for any equilibrium outcome
assumption implies that each individual takC2 the composition of
the community as given when voting. This greatly simplifie. the strategic
interactions between communities.
7Note that we have implicitly assumed that education is the only
technology available by which a parent can contribute to her child's income.—8—
each individual must reside in the community that yields her the
gr.-ater utility.
Define h(.y) to be the individual housing demand resulting from the
ma.imization problem in (4). By homotheticity h can be written as
Gi';en a set of residents of mass Nj and a tax rate tj in Cj, the variables qj
ant: Pj wuSt satisfy:
—H(p) (5.1)
— (5.2)
where is mean income in Cj .Thefirst equation requires that the housing
market clear. The second states that the quality of education qj equals the
per (old) person tax revenue of the community. It is straightforward to show
that for any positive value of t1 equation (5.1) has a unique solution for p.
Furthermore, p is decreasing in tj and is increasing in tj.
The following assumption on preferences greatly facilitates
characterization of equilibrium in the two—stage game.9
Assumption 1.:For all w,y v'(q)/(u(c,h)h(R,y)J is increasing in y.
Since v'/(uh) is the slope of an individual's indifference curve in q—
space, Assumption 1 guarantees that this slope is increasing in initial
income, i.e. that
81n what follows we assume that the optimization problem in (4) results
in interior solutions for c and h.
9Th1s assumption is a single—crossing condition. While its algebraic
expression depends on the particular model, it is used by the multi—community
literature to induce separation of individuals and thus allow equilibria to be
characterized (see, for example, ¶Jesthoff (1977), Fernandez and Rogerson
(1992, 1993) and Benabou (1994)),—9—
S_ucch(l_-why) +uchhhy
+uh<0 (6)
The power of this assumption to characterize equilibrium is seen in the
next two propositions which are common in the multicouununity literature.
Proposition 1: Given a set of residents, majority voting over taxratesin a
community results in the preferred taxrateof the resident with the median
income.
Proof: This follows immediately from the property of indifference curves
discussed previously. See Fernandez and Kogerson (1993) and Epple and Roceer
(1991) for detailed proofs in slightly different contexts.II




(ii) All individuals in C1 have income at least as great as any
individual in C2
where C1 is defined as the community with the higher value of q.
*** *
Proof:(i.)Ifl<c2 and q1q2 then all individuals prefer tolive in C1,
which contradicts the assumption that no communityisempty.
(ii) Follows directly from Assumption I regarding the slopeof indifference
curves in (q,ir)spaceas a function of y.II
Proposition 2 implies that an equilibrium with q"qwillbe
characterized by the coexistence of a community with highincomeresidents,
highgross—of—taxhousing prices, and high quality education andanother
community with lower income residents, low gross—of—tax housing prices,and a
lower quality of education.—10—
Any equilibrium that displays property (ii) of Proposition 2 is said to
be a stratified equilibrium and is common to multi—community models.1°
Problems of existence and uniqueness of a stratified equilibrium are endemic
to multi—community models (see, for example, Westhoff (1977,1979) and Epple,
Ftlimon and Romer (1984) for a discussion). In all of the simulations
reported later in the paper, however, the specifications are such that a
unique stratified equilibrium exists.
Lastly, we turn to a characterization of the tax rates generated by
lajority voting. Using (5.1) and (5.2) one can write qj(t,,N) and
as the quality of education and tax inclusive housing price, respectively, in
Cgivena tax rate t,communitymean incomeand a community population of
N. The preferred tax rate for an individual with income y is determined by:
Max u(y—wh,h) +v(q(t,p,N))
s.t. (5.1) and (5.2)
(7)
and where h solves (4), i.e. is the utility maximizing choice given w(tj,N)
and y.
Using the envelope theorem, the first order condition for this problem
implies:
uh(p4(l+t)p]_ v'q (8)
10There may also exist equilibria which are not stratified. For example,
given identical housing supply functions there always exists an equilibrium in
which the two communities are identical. i.e. half of each income group
resides in each community, resulting in equal tax rates, prices, and quality
of education. In the analysis that follows, however, we only consider
stratified equilibria. See Westhoff (1979) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1992)
for a discussion in a slightly different context of how requiring stability of
equilibria can eliminate all non—stratified equilibria.—11—
where p(t,,N) solves(5.1) and (5.2). Note that p+(l+t)pt—d/dt>O.
In a stratified equilibrium C1 has both higher mean and higher median
income than C2. Two comparative statics exercises, therefore, are of
interest; how is the tax rate that solves (8), denoted by ,affectedby (i)
a change in y and (ii) a change in M? Straightforward calculation yields:
3/8y—S/D> 0 (9)
and
+ (vqq + vq)
D (1)
where D denotes the second derivative of the maximand in (7) with respect to
t. y the second order condition, D is non—positive at a maximum.
Thefirst expression states that higher income individuals prefer higher
tax rates and necessarily, therefore, higher quality education. The second
expression says that an increase in mean income has an ambiguous effect on an
individual's preferred taxrate.Thus it is not possible to state whether in
equilibrium C1 must have a higher or lower tax rate than C2. As will be seen
in the next section, evidence on the relationship between community mean
income and spending on education suggests that the sign of ôt/8p is negative.
Thus far we have discussed extensively the properties of equilibrium of
the two—stage game for any period t without making reference to future
periods. It was possible to do so since the outcome in period t is—12—
independentof the future evolution of the state variable.11 Since our larger
game simply repeats this two—stage game every period, we need only keep track
of the state variable of this game—the income distribution of old agents—
which we write as —(),1,A2, •)where is the fraction (or equivalently
mass) of old agents with income equal to Yj.
If is the income distribution of old individuals at the beginning of
period t,thenan equilibrium to the two—stage game in period tgeneratesa
beginning—of—period income distribution for period t÷l, A÷i. We denote by
A(A)theset of values for At+i that correspond to subgame—perfect equilibria
of the two—stage game given At—i.Ina later section of the paper we focus on
the properties of a stationary or steady state for the system i.e. a value
such that *A(A*)
3.Calibration
The objective of this work is to quantify the effects of a major change
in the system of financing education. To do so it is necessary to specify
functional forms for the relationships introduced in the previous section and
assign parameter values. We first turn though to a brief description of the
computation of equilibrium.
3.1 Computation of Equilibrium
11This fact, which greatly simplifies the analysis, follows from the
assumption that an old individual cares about the young individual's income
rather than utility, thus severing the link between on. time period and the
next. This is a commonly used device to render this typ. of analysis
tractable. See, for example, Cooper (1992), Durlauf (1992) and Clomm and
Ravikumar (1992). See Krussel and Rios—Rull (1993) for an illustration of the
difficulties in relaxing this assumption.—13—
We use numerical methods to solve for the equilibrium of our model.
Given a beginning—of—period income distribution, our algorithm finds all
stratified equilibria to the two—stage game played in each period. The key
fact used in this procedure is that all potential stratified equilibrium can
be parameterized by the fraction of the population that resides in C1. We
denote this fraction as p. Each value of p determines the income
distributions of the two communities since it partitions the income space into
higher income individuals that reside in C1 and lower income individualsthat
reside in C2. Associated with each value of p is a highest income individual
in C2; call this value Yb2 Let Ybi be the lowest income of an individual in
Cl.
Define Wj(P) to be the utility of an individual with income Ybj residing
in Cj given that p partitions the residents of the two communities and that
each community chooses its tax rate via majority vote. An equilibrium can be
depicted as a crossing of the two curves.12 We compute the Wj curves and
therefore find all the stratified equilibria. In all our simulations the
stratified equilibrium is unique.
Given an initial income distribution, repeated application of the above
procedure can be used to solve for the entire equilibrium sequence.We look
for stable steady—state income distributions by examining the dynamic pathfor
A that results from each of a large set of initial distributions.In our
simulations we find a unique (stable) steady state and convergence always
occurs.
12Since the Ybi are discontinuous functions of p (given a discontinuous
income distributioni, the equilibrium need not require W1(p)—W2(p).— 14—
3.2 Functional Forms
Three functional relationships need to be specified: preferences, housing
supply and the effect of the quality of education on subsequent earnings. For
preferences we assume:




Th specification for u(ch) is a transformation of a constant elasticity of
substitution utility function. Note that Assumption 1 will be satisfied if
and only ifturns out to be strictly negative (given v'(q)>O). The choice
for u(y) displays constant relative risk aversion.




This specification yields the same price elasticity for both communities (i.e.
b).
The final relationship to be specified is that linking quality of
education to subsequent earnings. We assume that each individuals realized
income is a draw from a discrete approximation to a log—nornal distribution
whose mean depends on q. In particular, consider a log normal distribution of







Given a vector (.) whereYj is contained in j'j41 for
i—l,2,...I—1, and y1)'1, we transforn the continuous distribution in (13) Co
a discrete distribution over the I income types (hence obtaining the 1(q)) by
integrating the above log normal distribution over the interval containing
Afew comments should be noted concerning this choice. First, Z>O
implies that expected income is increasing in q. Second, we assume that is
independent of q. Third, m(q) can be concave or convex in q, depending on
whether S is smaller or larger than one. Lastly, it should be noted that (13)
is a specification meant to hold only over the relevant region of q, since
otherwise some combinations of parameter values and q yield negative expected
income. 13
3.3 Parameter Values
We choose parameter values such that the steady—state equilibrium of the
model matches important observations for the US economy. In particular, we
require that the steady state match several aggregate expenditure shares,
elasticities, and properties of the income distribution for the US economy.
There are three commodities in the model: consumption, housing, and
education, and hence two independent expenditure shares. The ratio of annual
aggregate housing expenditures to aggregate expenditures on consumption (which
includes housing). H/TC, (averaged over 1960—1990) is 0.15, and the average
annual ratio of spending on public elementary and secondary education to
aggregate expenditures on consumption, E/TC, is 0.053.
13The term (1+q) is used rather than q as a normalization to avoid large
negative numbers.—16-.
We match four elasticities: the price elasticities for housing demand and
supply and the elasticity of mean earnings with respect to the
quality of education mq' and the cross—sectional elasticity of community
public education expenditures with respect to community mean income
Quigley (1979) surveys the literature on urban housing markets. Based on
this survey we choose to match a price elasticity of housing demand (gross of
taxes) equal to —.7 and a price elasticity of housing supply equal to .5.
Estimates of the demand elasticity range as high as —.95, however, and the
range of estimates of the supply elasticity is large. Additionally, the
mapping between the (implicit) models underlying these elasticity estimates
and our model is not exact. Hence we also explore the effect of different
price elasticities for our results.1-4 Note that the functional form we have
chosen for the utility function does not imply a constant demand price
elasticity for housing. By homotheticity, however, the price elasticity of
demand for housing is independent of income so that we can use the model's
cross—sectional steady—state observations of housing prices and per capita
housing quantities to compute the (gross) price elasticity,15 We normalize
the parameter a in the housing supply function to equal 1.
A key difference between the two communities in our model is that in
equilibrium C1 has both higher mean income and quality of education than C2.
Therefore, from the steady—state equilibrium one can compute a cross—sectional
elasticity of (per—student) expenditures on education with respect to
14Additional empirical studies are surveyed in Olsen (1986).
demand elasticity less than one in absolute value corresponds to a
negative value of o, which is required to satisfy Assumption 1.—17—
community mean income. Many empirical studies obtain estimates of this
elasticity(see Inman(1979)and Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982) for
surveys). The range of estimates obtained in these studies is 0.24—1.35, with
the vast majority of the estimates lying in the narrower range of 0.4—0.8. We
choose parameter values so that when evaluated at the steady—state
equilibrium. Note that a value greater than zero but smaller than one is
significant since itimpliesthat, ceteris paribus, communities with higher
mean incomes spend more on education but taxata lower rate.
To choose a value for the elasticity of mean earnings with respect to
education quality we rely on evidence presented by Card and Krueger (1992),
Wachtel (1976), and Johnson and Stafford (1973). Card and Krueger. using
several indicators of quality of schooling across states and time, estimate
that a decrease in the student to teacher ratio by ten students would increase
earnings by 4.2%. Over the period 1924—1964 the average axuiu.al ratio of
teachers wages to total costs for public elementary and secondary schools was
54% and the average annual student—teacher ratio over the same period was
28.0. The resulting estimate of the elasticity of earnings with respect to
education expenditures (quality) is 0.1774.16 Wachtel, in a study that
examines the returns to schooling using school district expenditure levels,
finds an elasticity of 0.2. Since college expenditures are included as a
separate variable in his regressions, it is reasonable to view this estimate
as being on the low side to the extent that higher secondary education
16Note that Card and Kruegers elasticity estimates combine two different
effects of quality on earnings: an increase in earnings holding years of
education constant, and an increase in wages due Co increased years of
education. While our model abstracts from the effect of quality on years of
education, we believe that the combined effect is the appropriate measure.—18—
exnditures also increase the probability of attending a higher quality
colLege. Johnson and Stafford also find an elasticity estimate of 0.2. In
our benchmark ca1ibraton we choose mq°•1911 and explore the sensitivity of
our results to changes in this value in section 5. We compute the elasticity
by ising the cross—sectional variation in the steady—state values of q across
comaunities and equation (13) relating q to mean earnings.
The final piece of information we use in calibration is data on the
incuale distribution of families from the 1980 Census. We choose the i' to
mat.h the commonly used (in thousands) income intervals—y—(0,5.7.5,10.lS,2O.
25, 35,50)—and set the vector of yj's equal to (2.5,6.75,8.75,12.5.17.5.22.5,
30,.2.5,60). Twoadditionalitems of information that we match in the steady
stae of our model are the 1980 Census values of mean and median family income
values, equal to 21.4 and 17.9 respectively.17
Lastly, in our benchmark specification we set —0 which implies that v(q)




Although this choice of -y is somewhat arbitrary, this value lies within the
range of estimates for risk aversion obtained in the asset pricing literature
when preferences are defined over consumption sequences. In Section 5 we
consider alternative values for this parameter.
17When we compute median income in the model we assume that individuals
with income yj are uxiiforaly distributed over the interval
18The fit of this approximation depends on how closely the transformation
from a continuous to a discrete distribution preserves the mean of log income.—19—
Thus the items of information described above (two expenditure shares,
four elasticities, mean and median income) and the chosen values of -yanda
can be used to determine the eight parameter values: 8. aq. b, 6, a B. y0
and a2.
3.4 Discussion
Oneissueconcerning the calibration procedure should be noted. Whereas
the model assumes that public education is entirely financed at the local
level, in the US state aid accounts for a substantial portion of expenditures
on education. It is possible, therefore, that the statistics that we match in
the calibration procedure are not invariant to the structure of educational
finances, and hence should not be used to calibrate a model with pure local
financing. The fact that financing provisions have changed significantly over
the last thirty years provides an opportunity to gauge the extent of this
problem. The aggregate expenditure shares for housing and (elementary and
secondary) education have been relatively constant over this period and we
know of no evidence to indicate significant changes in the price elasticity of
housing demand over time. Hence the concern raised by this issue for these
estimates is probably minor.
On the other hand, calibrating the model to match the cross—sectional
elasticity of expenditures on education per student with respect to community
mean income is potentially more problematic. Much of the empirical work in
this area effectively involves a regression of (log of) community education
expenditures par student on a number of variables including log of community
mean income and a variable designed to capture the effect of state aid on the
marginal price of education expenditures faced by the tax payer. The—20--
coefficient on meanincomeis then interpreted as the elasticity of
expenditures with respect to mean income. While the empirical work attempts
to take into account the rules by which state aid is provided, the elasticity
estimated need not be invariant to these rules. This is perhaps less
problematic than may appear at first, however, since the estimates are derived
from studies of different states and many of the estimates are quite similar.
Nonetheless, in light of these concerns, Section S provides a sensitivity
analysis that allows us to address how changes in the values of the
elasticities used in the calibration affect our results.
4. Results
4.1 Properties of the Benchmark Model
In this section we report the parameter values generated by the
calibration described in the previous section and present some additional
properties of the steady state and of the dynamics of the systei. As noted
before, our computations yield a unique equilibrium for the one period game, a
unique stable steady state, and convergence to the steady state)9
Table I below reports the parameter values used in the calibration and
the steady—state values for several variables and Table 2 provides the steady—
state values of the community variables..
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Note that, as required for a stratified equilibrium, both quality and the
gross price of housing are higher in community one. The net—of—tax priceof
housing is also higher in C1. This is essential to produce stratification
since the tax rate in C1 is lower than that in C2 as required by qM<l (given
q1>q2 and p1>p2).
Spending per student is nearly twice as large in C1 as in C2. Although
there are many metropolitan areas in which this range of expenditures exists,
this ratio is somewhat on the extreme side of what is observed in the US data.
This is not surprising, however. Our model describes how expenditures would
vary across communities if all financing were done at the local level. The
fact that differences are not as large in the US data as they are in our
calibrated model simply indicates that state aid does (on average) decrease
differences in education expenditures across communities.
In the steady state all individuals with income greater than 22.5 live in
C1, all individuals with income less than 22.5 live in C2, andindividuals
with income equal to 22.5 are split across the two communities. Since the
quality of education differs across communities, the children of wealthier
individuals will belong to a different income distribution when old than that
of the children of poorer individuals. In the steady state computed above,







































In this section we determine the effects of switching to a public
education system in which there is no local financing. Rather, per student
expenditures on education are the same regardless of the community of
residence and the total level of expenditure is determined at the state (or
national) level.20 Of courses the ann.rbywhich revenue is raised is also
important. We maintain the property tax as the taxinstrumentso as to keep
the local versus national question starkly focused.
20This is similar to the system of financing education of some European
cotmtries.—24—
Formally, the stage game of section 2 is modified so that in the second
stage voting is over a single property taxrateand expenditur.s per student
are equal across communities.21 It should be clear that in a subgame—perfect
equilibrium of this game the price of housing must be equal across
communities: since all individuals face the same taxrateandobtainthe same
quality of education independently of the community in which they live, no one
would choose to reside in the community with the higher housing price.
We use the functional forms and parameter values from the calibration
procedure described in the preceding section to determine the effects of the
change in policy. This is a classic policy analysis exercise in which the
fundamentals or primitives are held constant but individuals are allowed to
adjust their decision rules in response to the change in policy environment.
We compute the steady—state equilibrium for this economy. It remains
true that there is a unique equilibrium in each period, a unique stable steady
state, and that the economy converges to thesteadystate. Table 4 displays
some of the properties of the steady—state equilibrium.
TAZLE4




mean income —22.28,median income —18.54
21Note that no additional sources of education finance are allowed, i.e.
no local supplements.—25—
A comparison of the steady—state outcomes generated by the two systems
yields several expected results. Since the median voter and mean income of
the entire economy Liesbetweenthose of the individual communities, it is not
surprising that, for example, spending per student in the steady state of the
second system lies between the corresponding values for the two communities of
the first system, as do the tax rate and the price of housing. Two results
(not necessarily expected) are that average income and education expenditures
as a fraction of total consumption are both greater under national financing.
These will turnOut to becentral to our welfare results.
Our analysis also allows us to trace out the transition path between the
two steady—states. Properties of the transition will be important to the
welfare calculation of Section 4.3. For completeness, Table 5 shows the
evolution of the tax rate, housing price, the quality of education, mean
income, and E/TC from period I (defined as the first period in which
individuals vote on a national tax rate given the income distribution, but not
the residence pattern, generated by the local finance steady state) to period
4(thefirst period in which the national finance steady state is attained)
TABLE5.
Transition to National Finance Steady State
period p q H €/TC
1 .4000 1.2840 1.1642 21.5632 .0571
2 .3874 1.3236 1.1799 22.2184 .0561
3 .3858 1.3273 1.1801 22.2760 .0559
4 .3858 1.3274 1.1801 22.2765 .0559—26--
As can be noted from Table 5, the transition to the steady State is
monotonic in all the relevant variables as of period 1. Compared to the local
steady—state equilibrium of period 0, however, the transition entails a jump
inE/TCas the median voter first chooses a large taxrateto increase
spending on education by a large amount and then, as the income distribution
shifts to the right and total income increases, the tax rate and E/TC are
chosen progressively smaller.22 We now turn to the question of the effect of
this policy change on welfare.
4.3 Welfare Effects
It is clearly desirable to have some measure of the welfare effects
associated with the change in the education financing system. We construct
the following welfare measure. For each economy we compute, for each period
t, the expected utility (EU) for a hypothetical individual whose income is a
random draw from that period's income distribution. Thus, if is the
fraction of the population with income Yj and is the utility of an
individualwithincome then the expected utility in period t is given by:
EU_ Fi'i (15)
Henceforth we defineEU0to be the value of EU in the steady state of the
local financesystem.
We first examine the value of EU in the local financing steady state vs.
the nationalfinancing steadystate. Under the local system EU—.3l97; under
the national system EU—. 3117.In order to translat. the difference in
22The income level of the median voter remaini unchanged throughout the
transition. This need not always be the case and would generically not be so
ifa continuous incomedistribution were used.—27—
utilityinto a measure not affected by monotone transformations of the utility
function, we calculate the percent, t, by which the vector of income
(y1,y2,
.y9) would have to be reduced in the national financing system to
tender the hypothetical Individual indifferent between the two economies.
This calculation holds prices, taxratesand quality of education constant at
their original equilibrium levels. The magnitude of the required decrease in
income is 3.2%. This is a very large difference in welfare; welfare Costs of
alternative policies usually turn out to be a fraction of a percent of total
income.
We next examine the welfare effects along the transition path to the new
steady stare. Table 6 shows the value of EU from period 0—the steady—state
under local financing—through period 4 (at which point the economy is at ts
steady—state equilibrium under the national financing system).
TABLE6







Note that the third column gives, for each period t, the percentage by
which the vector of income would have to be changed in order to equate that
periods EUt to EU0 (recall that prices, taxrateand quality of education at—28—
kept at the equilibrium level attained in period t).23 Note that period 1
will have, ceteris paribus, a greater tendency to have a negative A associated
with it since any change in income distribution will not be realized until the
following period (i.e. the income distribution of this period is that from the
steady state under local finance).24
In order to end up with an overall welfare evaluation which includes the
transition path, we need to assign a discount rate and the associated length
of a period, r. If each period is interpreted to be the productive life of an
individual, 30 years seems a reasonable benchmark. The structure of our
model, however, is such that an individual spends th. same length of time
going to school when young as being productive when old. Thus another
reasonable alternative is a time period of 15 years. We explore the
implications of both possibilities. Instead of arbitrarily assigning an
annual discount factor, however, we ask at what rate must the future be
discounted in order for both systems (including the transition to the national




For r—30, this yields 9—.924 or an implicit annual interest rate r—8.2%. For
any discount factor greater than .924, therefore, under the welfare criteria
used it would be beneficial to switch to a national finance system.
23Note chat by our previous definition, A0—O.
24See Benabou (1992) for a somewhat different tension that exists between
long run and short run welfare.—29—
Similarly,for r—l5theimplied annual interest rate required for indifference
is r—17.2%.
Note that the above welfare calculation did not take into account the
welfare of the owners of housing (who receive the rental income)Total
producer surplus from the housing market is easily computed in the two
economies: Relative to its value in the steady state under local financing, it
first decreases by 1.7% in period 1. and then increases first by 2.89% in
period 2, and thereafter by 3.33% in each subsequent period (recall that the
comparison is always with period 0—the steady—state under local financing).
Therequired for indifference in this case i higher (—.966 for f—30) but
in any case producer surplus is a small fraction of total steady—state income
(roughly 10%).
What is the source of the larga overall welfare gain? By definition, any
difference in welfare must be induced by changes in the Vj and/or changes in
the Ai. Thus, we must examine the change in utility derived from each income
level's new c,h, and q bundle as well as the overall change in the income
distribution.
Comparing across steady states, for the two financing systems studied
above, each of the is greater under local financing. That is, for each
given income level, the steady state of the local financing system is
preferred to that of the national financing system. Since expected utility is
higher under national financing, it must be the case, therefore, that
favorable changes in the distribution of income (i.e. the At's) more than
offset the decrease in the Vj's. This points to a tradeoff that is central to
a comparison of a local and a national financing system. On the one hand, a—30—
local system has the ability to make individuals better off by allowing them
greater scope to sort themselves into communities that more closely reflect
their preferences ziven their income than does a national system that forces
individuals to consume the same quantity of the publicly provided good. On
the other hand, a national system may yield a better income distribution (in
that higher output is generated) than a local system which generates greater
heterogeneity in education expenditures. We now turn to a more detailed
examination of these points.
Note first that the steady—state Income distribution under national
financing stochastically dominates that under local financing; in particular,
A1 through A4aregreater under local financing whereasA5—A9aregreater
under national financing. The income distribution under national financing is
characterized by a single parameter—the mean of the log normal distribution
(recall that the variance is constant). Thus, an explanation of the higher
level of mean income should provide insight into th. higher welfare achieved
under the national financing system.
Although equation 13 allows the mean of log income to be either concave
or convex in q, our finding of 6—3.9 implies substantial concavity. It
follows that holding total spending on education fixed, next period's mean
income is greatest if these funds are divided equally across all students.
Whereas equal division of funds is what occurs under national financing,
under local financing students in C2 receivs roughly half the per student
expenditures as students in C1. To obtain an idea of how much this concavity
matters, we calculate the income distribution that would result from
distributing total steady—state expenditures on education in the local system—31—
equally across students. The mean of the resulting income distribution is
22.02. a gain of 2.1% over the mean of 21.56 that results from the pattern of
educational expenditures found in the steady state under local financing and
63.9% of the total increase in mean income found in the steady state of the
national system. Thus, there are large gains to be realized simply by
spreading resources equally across all students, the remainder of the gain in
mean income coming from the increased education expenditures induced by a
change in financing systems.
It may be thought that a substantial portion of thewelfareincrease is a
consequence of concavity of preferences over q since our calibration implies
that v(q) is concave. Holding total spending on education Constant,
therefore, the average value of v(q) is maximized by a constant q across
communities. A simple calculation, however, indicates that thequantitative
magnitude of this effect is small, In particular, using the steady—state
equilibrium values underlocalfinancing yields v(p*q+(l_p*)q) exceeding
p*v(q)+(l_p*)v(q) by 0.0008, which is only about 10% of the difference in
steady—state expected utilities for the two financing systems.
We now turn to a closer e,camin.ation of the tradeoff between local and
national financing systems via the us. of twoillustrativeexamples.
4.4TwoExamples
The previous discussion of welfare effects highlighted two opposing
factors central to a comparison of local and national financing systems. On
the one hand, local finance permits heterogeneous agents to obtain bundles
closer to their preferred ones. On the other hand, the equalization of
expenditures across students that occurs in a national system mayresultin—32—
greater mean income. In our benchmark model the second effect is dominant.
Here we present two examples to show that this outcome is a resultofthe
particular parameter values generated by our calibration procedure and is not
inherent to the structure of the model. These examples may alsohelp to
illustratethe nature of the tradeoff described above.
Table 7 displays parameter values (where different froii the benchmark
model) and some selected statistics for the steady—state allocations under
local financing for the two examples and for the benchmark. As the table
indicates, both examples are not acceptable from th. perspective of our
calibration procedure. Moat importantly, in Example 1, is too high and
in Example2, is too low. Ourfocusis on the predictions of these two
examplesfor steady—state welfare gains associated with a change from local
finance to national finance. These are reported on the last row of the table.
Expressed as before in terms of output, ,thegains ar. —6.2 and +.27 percent
for Examples 1and2 respectively.
Table8 presents two additional pieces of information useful for
interpreting the above diffetences in welfare predictions. First it lists
preferred tax rates in the steady stat. under national financing by income
level for the benchmark model (BM) and the two examples. This provides some
indication of the extent to which individuals desire different bundles of
goods.25 Preferred tax rates exhibit the smallest range in Example2 and the
greatestrange in Example I. The second piece of information provided is the
percent change in mean income (%ii)thatwould result if the resources devoted
25Note that this is a rough indication since both preferences and
technology differ in the three cases.—33—
to educationin the local financing steady state were spread equallyacross
all students (as in the discussion on page 30). This figure provides some
indication of the potential gains from equalizing expenditures. Note that
this number is largest in the benchmark model and smallest in Example 2.
TABLE 7
SelectedFeatures Under Local Financing
BM Ex. I Ex. 2
6 —3.9 .5 —8
8 8 .23 35
y0 3.0 2.0 2.9
a .03 .05 .20
21.56 18.16 21.79
E/TC .0545 .0852 .0556
.616 3.12 .35
.19 .15 .03
A 3.2 —6.2 .27
TABLE8
PreferredTaxRatesUnder National Financing and Sm
Ex.1 Ex.2
.22 .00 .30
Y2 .30 .08 .35
y3 .32 .16 .36
y4 .35 .32 .38
y5 .39 .51 .40
.41 .68 .42
y7 .44 .93 .44
y8 .49 1.31 .46
Y9 .53 1.81 .48
Sm 2.1 1.0 .2
An explanation of the contrasting results for welfare gains in the three
cases is as follows. Example2 isa case where spending on education is not
veryimportant(as evidenced by the small value of jq).Consequently,
neither of the twofactorsmentioned above is particularly significant and the—34—
overall welfare gain is also small. Example 1 is a cas. where heterogeneity
is quite important. Thus, although there are sizable gains to be had simply
by smoothing expenditures across students, these are outweighed by the gains
associated with allowing individuals to sort themselves into different
communities. Relative to Example 1, the benchmarkmodelreverses the relative
magnitudes of the two effects yielding a larg. overall welfare improvement.
5. Sensitivity Analysis and Alternative Comparisons
Our calibration exercise relies on several estimates obtained from
empirical work. Because the empirical studiss often suggest a range of
estimates rather than a single value, it is of interest to check the
sensitivity of our policy analysis to the use of a].t.rnative values in the
calibration exercise. Furthermore, it is also of interest to see what our
model implies for some statistics not used in our calibration exercise.
5.1 Sensitivity to Alternative Parameter Values
In all the exercises that follow, the model's parameters are
recalibrated, i.e. parameters are chosen so that th. model's steady—state
matches the appropriate set of statistics. To focus the discussion, we
consider only the effect of these alternatives on the steady—state welfare
calculation carried out in Section 4.3.
We begin with a brief discussion of three variations that we found to
have virtually no effect on the magnitude of th. steady—state welfare gain:
changes in the preference parameterand in the two housing price
elasticities. Recall that 1 was set to 0 in the benchmark specification. The
results are very similar when 1isset to values of —l and —5. Similarly, we—35—
found no significant effect of changing the values of the price elasticities
of housing used in the calibration. For the demand elasticity we used a value
of —.93 (which corresponds to the upper range of estimates) ,andfor the
supply elasticity we used values ranging from 1/3 to 3.
In contrast to the above, we foundthatvariations in andq
have
a significant impact on the magnitude of the steady—state welfare gains
predicted by our model. Table 9 presents the results for several alternative
values of these two elasticities. (In each case the table shows the parameter
values that differ from those of the benchmark specification.) In the
interest of space we do not include any of the other summary statistics for
the steady—state equilibria, but note that in all cases these values are




& B Y0 Sq A
1.28 —l .953.37 .030 5.67
.92 —2 2.003.135 .0324.48
.74 —3 4.303.052 .0304.10
.51 —5 18.52.985 .0322.90




.31—3.8 12.25 3.105 .0215.69
From the table we note that although changes in result in a sizable
range of associated welfare gains, in all cases the welfare gain is
substantial. Furtheriiore, welfare gains significantly larger than those
reported in Section 4.3 are apparently plausible. As for the alternative
values formq
these are not chosen in accord with any ranges based on—36—
empirical work (as indicated in Section 3, the range of estimates for this
value is in fact quite tight). Nonetheless, we think it informative to
indicate the sensitivity of our results to this value. For the range of
values displayed in the table, the steady—state welfare gain appears to be
rougbly linear in this elasticity.
5.2 Some Additional Comparisons
In addition to the previous sensitivity analysis, it is also of interest
to contrast the income distribution and the intergenerational mobility
generated by our model with that observed in reality as well as with some
alternative measures of the rate of return to education. Th, calibration
ensures that the mean and median income in the model's steady state are
approximately equal to their counterparts in the US data. The distribution of
income from the 1980 US Census is given by (.07,.06,.07,.l5.l5,.14,.l9,
.ll.,.06). As is well—known, the log normal distribution does a good job of
accounting for the observed income distribution except that it does not have
enough mass in the tails. Not surprisingly, therefore, comparing with the A
in Table 1, the saaa is true of the model's steady—state income distribution.
The intergenerational mobility implied by the steady—state equilibrium of
the mbdel are summarized by the numbers in Table 10 and contrasted with





lop Second Third Bottom
Top .31. .25 .22 .22
Child's (.42) (.26) (.20) (.11)
Income Second .23 .24 .25 .25
Quartile (.34) (.24) (.23) (.21)
Third .24 .25 .26 .26
(.16) (.27) (.31) (.33)
Bottow .22 .25 .27 .27
(.09) (.24) (.26) (.35)
Note that our model produces a smaller probability of a child ending up in the
cop quarter given that the parent is in that quarter and likewise a smaller
probability of remaining in the bottom quarter given that the parent is in
that quarter. This is probably in large part due to the fact that we only
have two communities and use a log normal distribution to approximate the
income distribution generated by the quality of education in each community.
Alargernumberofcommunities would give wealthier parents access to a higher
q (and thus their children a greater probability of being likewise wealthy)
and the opposite would hold for poorer parents.26'27
An additional piec. of information that can be computed using the steady—
state allocations is the implicit rate of return to expenditures on education.
In the steady state, C1 spends an additional q1—q2 per student on education.
26Note that the equivalent to Table 10 under national financing would
have .25 for all its entries since parental income doe. not affect the child's
income under a national system. Henc. there is greater intergenerational
mobility between the bottom and the top quartiles under a national financing
system.
27Higher values of either tm
q
or e in the calibration also makethe
model's predictions closer to Ziaiierman''numbers.—38—
This leads to a gain in mean income of m1—a2. Assuming that a period lasts r




For a time period of thirty years, using the appropriate steady—state values
yields r—.0422 whereas for r—15, r—.086.
There is a fairly large literature that attempts to determine the rate of
return to investment in human capital, in particular, the return to an
additional year of schooling (see, for example. Becker (1975)). Returns of
between 4 and 9 percent are at the lower half of the range found in this
literature, where the typical range is 5—15%. Although our calibration
procedure does not attempt Co match this rate of return, it is obviously
closely related toaq'
which is defined as (log(m1)—log(m2)]/(log(q1)—
log(q2)]. Thus one possibility is to calibrate to a larger i'q yielding
higher implied annual rates of return (See Table 9).
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a dynamic multi—community model and calibrates it to
US data. W. use th. calibrated model to evaluate the consequences of
reforming the public education finance system from a system of pure local
finance to one in which education is financed at the national level and
expenditures per student are equal across communities.
We analyze the effects of such a reform on allocations and welfare, both
across steady states and along the transition path. Our findings indicate a
substantial welfare gain associated with this change in policy. In our—39—
benchmark model the steady—state welfare gain associated with the national
finance system is over 3% of total income.
Some simplifying features of the model should be kept in mind when
interpreting the above welfare gain, First, our analysis assumes that all
parents sand their children to public schools. While under the current system
of local finance in the US less than 10% of children attend private schools,
itispossible that a move to a national finance system would increase this
proportion and thereby diminish public support for public expenditure on
education. Second, we assume that the quality of education is only affected
byspendingper student; in particular, we abstract from any peer effects and
assume that parental characteristics do not influence educational outcomes
other than through spending on education. Third, this welfare gain presumably
overstates the potential gain.s from reform facing a state whose educational
finance system is somewhere between the extremes of local and national
financing.28 Future work should focus on evaluating how the incorporation of
these factors in the model influences the evaluation of public education
finance systems.
281n the US, local spending accounts for roughly 45% of all spending on
public education. Potential benefits from r.forms d.p.nd on both th. fraction
of total expenditures accounted for by state aid and on the rules which govern
its allocation. A system whereby State aid simply matches local spending
dollar for dollar is obviously quite different from one in whichaidis
primarily targeted to lower—income communities. Th. framework developed here
can also be used to analyze systems which involve a mix of local and state
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